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Security Analysis of a Large-scale Concurrent Data
Anonymous Batch Verification Scheme for Mobile
Healthcare Crowd Sensing
Yinghui Zhang, Member, IEEE, Jiangang Shu, Ximeng Liu, Member, IEEE, Jin Li, and Dong Zheng
Abstract—As an important application of the Internet of
Things (IoT) technologies, mobile healthcare crowd sensing
(MHCS) still has challenging issues, such as privacy protection
and eciency. Quite recently in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
(DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2828463), Liu et al. proposed a large-
scale concurrent data anonymous batch verification scheme for
mobile healthcare crowd sensing, claiming to provide batch
authentication, non-repudiation, and anonymity. However, after
a close look at the scheme, we point out that the scheme
suers two types of signature forgery attacks and hence fails to
achieve the claimed security properties. In addition, a reasonable
and rigorous probability analysis indicates that the security
reduction from the security of the scheme to the hardness of
the Computational Die-Hellman (CDH) problem is invalid. We
hope that similar design flaws can be avoided in future design
of anonymous batch verification schemes for mobile healthcare
crowd sensing.
Index Terms—Cryptanalysis, Mobile healthcare crowd sensing,
Anonymity, Batch authentication.
I. Introduction
W ITH the rapid advancements of the Internet of Things(IoT) technologies, mobile healthcare crowd sensing
(MHCS) has emerged as a new sensing paradigm that is able
to facilitate the quality improvement of healthcare [1]. A rep-
resentative aspect of MHCS is that it can collect large amounts
of sensitive health data pertaining to individuals. Because
health data is usually sensitive and related to people’s lives,
security and privacy protection measures should be enabled
to eliminate erroneous data and prevent privacy violation [2].
In particular, the health data should be collected in a timely
fashion to respond to latency-sensitive scenarios such as the
medical emergency.
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Quite recently, Liu et al. [3] proposed a large-scale con-
current data anonymous batch verification scheme for mobile
healthcare crowd sensing, which is referred to as the MHCS
scheme for convenience. In MHCS, an improved certificateless
aggregate signature (CL-AS) serves as a fundamental building
block. As illustrated in Figure 1, four types of entities are in-
volved in MHCS: the management server (MS), the data center
(DC), requestors, and MHCS participants. MS is responsible
for the registration of each participant by issuing a half
private key. DC aggregates and verifies the health sensing data
collected by MHCS participants. Requestors submit healthcare
sensing tasks to DC and obtain corresponding healthcare
reports from DC. MHCS participants collect and submit health
sensing data to DC based on various smart terminals.
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Fig. 1. The system model of MHCS.
In [3], only MS is trusted by other entities. Put another way,
MHCS should be secure against possible attacks from other
untrusted entities. For one thing, a malicious participant may
submit erroneous data to DC and deny its malicious behaviors.
For another, malicious (or compromised) DC may forge a
signature on randomly chosen data to frame participants. To
prove the security of the MHCS scheme, the authors gave
a formal security proof (see Theorem 1 in Section III of
[3]) of the improved CL-AS scheme under the Computational
Die-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Furthermore, an informal
security analysis is made on the basis of the CL-AS security
to show that the MHCS scheme realizes batch authentication,
non-repudiation, and anonymity. However, after a close look
at their scheme, we find that not only any participant but
also (compromised) DC can successfully forge a signature
on any randomly chosen data. Thus, the MHCS scheme
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cannot provide the properties of batch authentication and non-
repudiation. In addition, based on a reasonable and rigorous
probability analysis, we show that the security reduction from
the security of the scheme to the hardness of the CDH problem
is invalid.
II. Review of Liu et al.’sMHCS Scheme
We first summarize the notations in Table I, and then briefly
review the MHCS scheme [3] below.
TABLE I
Notations used in theMHCS scheme.
Notation Description
s 2R S The element s is randomly chosen from the set S .
s1 k s2 The bit concatenation of two strings s1 and s2.
Ga (resp. Gm) A cyclic additive (resp. multiplicative) group of prime order q.
P A generator of Ga.
mi The health data collected by the participant with identity IDi.
sMS (resp. QMS ) The private (resp. public) key of the management server.
sDC (resp. QDC) The private (resp. public) key of the data center.
s1;i The half private key of the participant with identity IDi.
Q1;i The partial public key of the participant with identity IDi.
1) Initialization: Given a security parameter `, the system
is initialized as follows.
 MS first chooses a bilinear map eˆ : Ga  Ga ! Gm,
where Ga is a cyclic additive group and Gm is a cyclic
multiplicative group with the same prime order q. MS
also chooses two hash functions H1 : f0; 1g  Ga ! Ga
and H2 : f0; 1g  Ga ! Zq.
 Furthermore, MS picks sMC 2R Zq as its private key and
computes the corresponding public key QMS = sMS P,
where P is a generator of Ga. Similarly, DC generates
hsDC ;QDCi as its long-term key pair, where QDC = sDCP.
 Finally, MS publishes system parameters
h`; q; P;Ga;Gm; eˆ;H1;H2;QMS i:
2) Registration: As shown in Figure 2, to join the system,
a participant Ci with identity idi interacts with MS via a secure
channel as follows.
Participant MS
Fig. 2. The registration phase.
 Ci chooses s1;i 2R Zq as its half private key, and sends
hidi;Q1;ii to MS, where Q1;i = s1;iP.
 Upon receiving hidi;Q1;ii, MS chooses ai 2R Zq and
computes Q2;i = H1(idi;Q1;i); S 2;i = sMSQ2;i and
indexs;i = aiS 2;i; indexv;i = aiQ2;i: (1)
Then, MS locally stores hidi;Q1;i;Q2;i; indexs;i; indexv;ii,
sets S Ni = indexv;i and sends hS Ni; indexs;ii to Ci.
 Ci sets hs1;i; indexs;ii as its final privacy key1
1In [3], indexs;i, instead of S 2;i, is used in the signature generation for
identity anonymity (see Section IV of [3]).
3) Signing: Suppose mi is the health data collected by Ci. Ci
first chooses ki 2R Zq and a timestamp ti, which is the system
time and can be used to check the freshness of corresponding
messages, and then computes Vi = kiQ1;i, hi = H2(mi k ti;Vi),
Ui = indexs;i + kihis1;iQMS ; S N0i = EQDC (S Ni k hi k ti);
where E is a public key encryption algorithm. Finally, as
shown in Figure 3, Ci uploads hUi;Vi;mi; S N0i i to DC, which
acts as a required health sensing data and can be verified based
on Equation (2).
eˆ(Ui; P) = eˆ(indexv;i + hiVi;QMS ): (2)
Participant
DC
Participant
Anonymous Aggregation
Batch Verification
Fig. 3. The signing, anonymous aggregation and batch verification phases.
4) Anonymous Aggregation: As shown in Figure 3, DC
acts as the aggregator of the system. For 1  i  n, upon
receiving the health sensing data (i.e., authentication message)
hUi;Vi;mi; S N0i i from Ci before a given time T , DC performs
the following procedures to aggregate them into a single
authentication message.
 DC computes DsDC (S N0i ) = S Ni k hi k ti, where D is the
decryption algorithm corresponding to E.
 DC generates  = hU;V; indexvi as the aggregate au-
thentication message on the health sensing data set
hm1;m2; : : : ;mni, where
U =
X
1in
Ui;V =
X
1in
hiVi; indexv =
X
1in
indexv;i:
5) Batch Verification: DC thinks that  is a valid aggregate
authentication message if and only if Equation (3) holds.
eˆ(U; P) = eˆ(indexv + V;QMS ): (3)
If  is valid, DC approves the health sensing data mi uploaded
by Ci within the time slot T for 1  i  n. Otherwise, DC
aborts the health sensing data.
III. Security Analysis of Liu et al.’sMHCS Scheme
In this section, we first give an overview of attacks to the
MHCS scheme, and then clearly illustrate the attack details.
Finally, we show the security proof in [3] is invalid based on
a rigorous probability analysis.
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A. Overview of Attacks
In order to protect participants’ identity privacy, the im-
proved CL-AS scheme (see Section III of [3]), which fails to
realize anonymity, cannot be directly exploited in the MHCS
scheme (see Section IV of [3]). In MHCS, as shown in Equa-
tion (1), the partial private key and the corresponding public
key are blinded by MS and then sent to the participant. In
order to realize anonymity, in the signing phase, the participant
encrypts the blinded public key and sends the ciphertext to DC.
Finally, DC decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the blinded public
key which is used in the subsequent verification, anonymous
aggregation, and batch verification. Take the participant with
identity IDi as an example. It follows from Equation (2) that
the decrypted blinded public key indexv;i = S Ni is used in
the verification. In other words, the relationship between the
public key Q1;i and the partial private key S 2;i is not required
for generating a valid signature in that indexv;i is not computed
based on Q1;i in the verification. Particularly, the process of
blindness in Equation (1) is based on a random parameter
and the master secret key is not involved. Therefore, any
participant can further blind its partial secret key indexs;i and
public key indexv;i to forge a signature on any message, which
corresponds to the scenario of Attack I in Section III-B.
Additionally, if DC is malicious or the private key of DC
is leaked, then the adversary can forge a signature on any
message based on a previous valid health sensing data from
any participant, which corresponds to the scenario of Attack
II in Section III-C.
B. Attack I: Forgery Attacks from Participants
Suppose participant Ci has a final private key hs1;i; indexs;ii.
We know indexs;i = aiS 2;i, S 2;i = sMSQ2;i, Q2;i = H1(idi;Q1;i),
and Q1;i = s1;iP. Then, as shown in Figure 4, for any randomly
chosen health sensing data mj 2R f0; 1g with j , i, Ci can
forge a signature message hUj ;Vj ;mj ; S Nj 0i below:
Malicious
DC
Participant
Fig. 4. The scenario of attack I.
Forgery Attack: Ci performs the following procedures.
1) Choose s1; j; k

j 2R Zq, and set Q1; j = s1; jP, Vj = kjQ1; j.
2) Compute hj = H2(m

j k tj ;Vj ), where tj is the current
system time and is used as a timestamp.
3) Choose aj 2R Zq and set
indexs; j = a

j indexs;i; S N

j = a

jS Ni (i:e:; a

j indexv;i):
4) Compute Uj = index

s; j + k

jh

j s

1; jQMS .
5) Compute S Nj
0 = EQDC (S Nj k hj k tj).
6) Send hUj ;Vj ;mj ; S Nj 0i to DC.
Verification: The forged signature message hUj ;Vj ;mj ;
S Nj
0i can be verified by DC as follows.
1) Compute DsDC (S N

j
0) = S Nj k hj k tj .
2) Ensure hj = H2(m

j k tj ;Vj ), and set indexv; j = S Nj .
3) Think that hUj ;Vj ;mj ; S Nj 0i is valid if and only if
eˆ(Uj ; P) = eˆ(index

v; j + h

jV

j ;QMS ): (4)
Anonymous Aggregation: For 1  j  n, upon receiving
the forged signature message hUj ;Vj ;mj ; S Nj 0i, DC performs
the procedure 1) and procedure 2) in the above verification
phase. Then, DC aggregates the messages into a single au-
thentication message  = hU;V; indexvi, where
U =
X
1 jn
Uj ;V
 =
X
1 jn
hjV

j ; index

v =
X
1 jn
indexv; j: (5)
Batch Verification: hU;V; indexvi is a valid aggre-
gate authentication message on the health sensing data set
hm1;m2; : : : ;mni if and only if
eˆ(U; P) = eˆ(indexv + V
;QMS ): (6)
Correctness: Equation (4) is correct because
eˆ(Uj ; P) = eˆ(index

s; j + k

jh

j s

1; jQMS ; P)
= eˆ(aj indexs;i + k

jh

j s

1; jQMS ; P)
= eˆ(ajaiS 2;i + k

jh

j s

1; jQMS ; P)
= eˆ(ajaiQ2;i + k

jh

j s

1; jP;QMS )
= eˆ(indexv; j + h

jV

j ;QMS ):
(7)
It easily follows from Equation (5) and Equation (7) that
Equation (6) holds. Therefore, the above attack I is correct.
C. Attack II: Forgery Attacks from (Compromised) DC
In this case, the adversary is either the malicious DC, which
wants to frame other participants by forging signatures, or
any participant that gets the private key of (compromised)
DC. As shown in Figure 5, given a valid health sensing data
hU j;V j;m j; S N0ji from C j, the adversary can forge a signature
message hUj ;Vj ;mj ; S Nj 0i below for any randomly chosen
health sensing data mj 2R f0; 1g.
Adversary
DC
Participant
(Malicious or Compromised)
Fig. 5. The scenario of attack II.
Forgery Attack: DC performs the following procedures.
1) Compute DsDC (S N
0
j) = S N j k h j k t j.
2) Set Vj = V j and compute h

j = H2(m

j k tj ;Vj ), where tj
is the current system time and is used as a timestamp.
3) Set Uj = h

jh
 1
j U j.
4) Set S Nj = h

jh
 1
j S N j and S N

j
0 = EQDC (S Nj k hj k tj).
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5) Use hUj ;Vj ;mj ; S Nj 0i as a signature message.
Verification, Anonymous Aggregation, and Batch Verifi-
cation are the same as those in Attack I.
Correctness: The above attack II is correct because
eˆ(Uj ; P) = eˆ(h

jh
 1
j U j; P)
= eˆ(hjh
 1
j (indexs; j + k jh js1; jQMS ); P)
= eˆ(hjh
 1
j (a jS 2; j) + k jh

j s1; jQMS ; P)
= eˆ(hjh
 1
j (a jQ2; j) + h

jV j;QMS )
= eˆ(hjh
 1
j S N j + h

jV

j ;QMS )
= eˆ(indexv; j + h

jV

j ;QMS );
where indexv; j = S N

j and h

j are specified in the procedure 2)
of Verification.
D. Invalid Security Reduction in the Security Proof
The MHCS scheme [3] is based on an improved CL-AS
scheme. The formal security proof (see Theorem 1 in Section
III of [3]) shows a reduction from the security of the improved
CL-AS scheme to the hardness of the CDH problem. However,
we find that the security reduction in the security proof is
invalid. In the proof, the challenger C, who plays the role
of a solver of the CDH problem, is given a random CDH
instance (P; aP; bP), where a; b 2R Zq. C sets QKGC = aP (i.e.,
QMS = aP). In the new queries to H1, C flips a coin ci 2 f0; 1g
such that ci = 0 with probability  and ci = 1 with probability
1 . Then, C chooses i 2R Zq. If ci = 0, C sets Q2;i = i(bP).
Otherwise, ci = 1, it sets Q2;i = iP. In the extraction queries,
C returns failure if ci = 0, and otherwise returns corresponding
partial private key. In the signing queries, if ci = 1, C returns
failure and otherwise returns a signature.
In the analysis of the success probability of C, three events
E1; E2; E3 are defined. E1: C does not return failure in any
extraction queries from the adversary; E2: The adversary
generates (i.e., forges) a valid signature that can be verified;
and E3: The adversary outputs a valid forgery and C does not
return failure. It easily follows that Pr [E1]  (1   )qk and
Pr [E2jE1]  , where qk represents the number of extraction
queries, and  is the advantage of the adversary in attacking
the CL-AS scheme.
New Probability Analysis: As for Pr [E3jE1 ^ E2], it is
claimed in [3] that Pr [E3jE1 ^ E2]  . However, that’s not
true and in fact Pr [E3jE1 ^ E2]  qsig in that there are qsig
signing queries. In this case, the probability for C to succeed
in solving the CDH problem is
AdvCCDH = Pr [E1 ^ E2 ^ E3]
= Pr [E1]  Pr [E2jE1]  Pr [E3jE1 ^ E2]
 (1   )qk    qsig :
Define qmin = minfqmin; qsigg. Note that
(1   )qk    qsig  (1   )qmin    qmin
= (   2)qmin    
4qmin
:
Obviously, 14qmin is negligible when qmin is large enough.
Thus, it cannot be concluded from AdvCCDH  4qmin that AdvCCDH
is non-negligible, which means the security reduction in the
formal security proof [3] is invalid.
IV. Conclusion
We analyzed the security of a large-scale concurrent data
anonymous batch verification scheme [3], and showed that two
types of signature forgery attacks exist and hence the scheme
fails to achieve the claimed properties of batch authentication
and non-repudiation. In addition, we showed that the security
reduction in the formal security proof is invalid. We remark
that it is still an open problem to design an ecient anonymous
batch verification scheme for mobile healthcare crowd sensing.
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